Originally Posted by
Wrecktangle
Bz, you only have one mathematically provably optimal betting fraction for a situation. And it is the so called "Full" Kelly Criterion. Dr. Kelly actually found the mathematical proof and published it. That means EVERYTHING else is sub-optimal.
Non-mathematicians seem to not understand the enormity of this. There are very few useful things in life that come under this situation.
In the economics of preferences, optimality is a relative term.
What's optimal for me (a butterscotch and banana lover), may very well be suboptimal for you (a chocolate and vanilla lover).
In Kelly's original paper, A New Interpretation of Information Rate, Kelly explores the expected growth maximizing methodology that would later become known as the "Kelly Criterion". The question of suitability for any particular investor was never actually established. Rather, Kelly made the a priori assumption that expected growth maximization (and expected growth maximization alone) was the only conceivable logical goal of all sensible investment strategies.
John Kelly was not an economist ... he was however, an apples and cinnamon lover and he never seemed to quite figure out what the hell it was with all those damned bananas, butterscotch candies, and chocolate and vanilla ice cream sandwiches (or to reference the dearly departed Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. "[who] wrote a story about flying-saucer people who visited Earth. Two things about the United States really bewildered them. 'What is it,' they wanted to know, 'about blow jobs and golf?'")
So the point is that while full Kelly is necessarily the optimal investment strategy for all market participants whose preferences happen to align themselves with those of Kelly's "Everyman Bettor", there is in reality absolutely nothing sacrosanct about expected growth maximization (at least not any more so than there is about a golden ratio of chocolate to vanilla swirls).
In an earlier post in this thread I mentioned that Kelly utility belonged to a class of utility function known as "isoelastic". These exhibit a property called "constant relative risk aversion" (or "CRRA") which, mathematically stated, means that the Utility function U(x) is a particular solution to the second-order differential equation:
x * d² dx² U(x) + ρ * d dx U(x) = 0
Where constant ρ > 0, is known as the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
The intuition behind CRRA is straightforward.
In the parlance of sports betting, if two CRRA bettors were described with identical ρ's, then irrespective of relative bankroll size, both bettors would choose to stake the same percentage of their respective bankrolls on any given wager.
It's this virtually axiomatic (if implicit) assumption of CRRA that is the impetus behind players and betting advisers (spanning what seems nearly a full cross-section of betting skill and temperament) structuring wagers as percentages of bankroll without regard to absolute bankroll size. Note that this is only economically "correct" (from the standpoint of traditional expected utility maximization) for bettors whose preferences exhibit CRRA.
So at this point let's see how the broader class of n-Kelly Utility (i.e., Kelly Utility across all positive Kelly multipliers) relates to CRRA preferences. We have the standard Kelly Utility function (for Kelly multiplier κ = 1):
U(x) = log(x)
As well as "fractional" or "multiple" Kelly for κ > 0, ≠ 1:
U(x) = (x1-1/κ - 1 )/( 1 - 1/κ)
(Note: the subtraction of one from the above numerator is simply a convenience that ensures utility of 0 for x = 1. As it's simply a translation of the utility curve by a constant, this term is often omitted in the literature, its presence or absence having no real effect on results. For the sake of anal retentivity, I always tend to include it.)
(Also note: As κ → 0, U(x) → 0 ∀ x. This represents, "total risk aversion", where a bettor will refuse all risk without regard to potential reward. By contrast, as κ → +∞, U(x) → x. This represents "risk neutrality", where a bettor will make his allocation decisions based solely on expectation without any regard to risk. The net effect of this would be that such a bettor would always wager his entire bankroll on the single bet with the highest edge. Hence, risk neutrality and total risk aversion are in fact subsets of n-Kelly utility.)
As it's simply a translation of the utility curve by a constant, this term is often omitted in the literature, its presence or absence having no real effect on results. For the sake of anal retentivity, I always tend to include it.)
Despite the different looking equations, one will note that the full Kelly utility function is simply "fractional" Kelly
utility taken as κ → 1.
The first derivative of Kelly Utility is given by:
U'(x) = x-1/κ
And the second derivative:
U''(x) = -1/κ * x-1/κ - 1
So plugging these in to the CRRA differential equation and solving for κ:
x * d² dx² U(x) + ρ * d dx U(x) = 0
x ρ * -1 / κ * (x-1/κ - 1) + x-1/κ = 0
κ = 1 ρ (for x≠ 0)
So what we see is that the so-called "Kelly multiplier" is simply the reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion ... implying that as a bettor's Kelly multiplier decreases he will become (relatively) more risk averse.
So once we allows ourselves to get past the presumed primacy of expected growth maximization, we see that the optimal allocation strategy for bettors with various Kelly multipliers, is nothing more and nothing less than the argmax of expected utility for bettors exhibiting CRRA with varying RRA coefficients.
This allows Kelly to prescribe behavior across a wide array of risk preferences, provided those preferences exhibit CRRA.
Now at this point I'm going to preempt anyone itching to argue with me that CRRA preferences are not valid in general for all classes of investors (or indeed for any class of investor) by simply stating:
CRRA preferences are not valid in general for all classes of investors (or indeed for any class of investor).
In fact, anyone who attempted to claim that CRRA preferences accurately described all "reasonable" classes of betting behavior would be guilty of precisely the same "sin" as the Right Honorable Dr. Kelly.
What we see is that Kelly only considered market operators with CRRA preferences who have a relative risk coefficient/Kelly multiplier of unity. Now "fractional" Kelly utility expands on full Kelly to include the entire class of CRRA bettors with nonnegative relative risk aversion coefficients, and while a fairly broad generalization of full Kelly, it by no means should be presumed to reflect the entirety of the universe of "reasonable" risk preferences.
Recall that the Taylor expansion of a function U(x) about x=a is given by:
[nbtable][tr][td]U(x) = [/td] [td] [/td] [td] U(i)(a) * (x-a)i/ i ! [/td][/tr] [/nbtable]
where U(i)(a) corresponds to the ith derivative of U wrt x evaluated at x=a.
Taking the first 3 terms of the Taylor expansion around x=1 (recall the above mentioned convenience of subtracting 1 from the numerator of the partial Kelly utility function -- who's laughing now?) gives us:
U(x) ≈ (x-1) - (x-1)² 2κ
And taking the expectation for Δ Bankroll → 0 we find:
E[U] ≈ μ - σ² 2κ
which should be familiar to anyone who's taken (and not forgotten) undergraduate financial economics as the Markowitz utility function.
So what we see is that not only is n-Kelly a generalization of full Kelly, but also (for small deviations in bankroll) is an asymptotic generalization of simple quadratic expected utility at the Markowitz-efficient frontier.
The problem comes when considering the higher order moments (technically about the origin) of the results distribution.
Because n-Kelly includes but a single descriptive parameter (i.e., the "Kelly multiplier"), it's unable to fully specify trade-offs between more than 2 distribution moments. So while n-Kelly can account for any relative utility/disutility trade-off between expectation and variance, the coefficient for the third moment is "locked in" (at κ+1 6κ² , it so happens), and so on and so forth for increasingly higher order moments.
In the end that's what the set of n-Kelly utility functions comes down to: a single κ parameter that specifies a predefined functional trade-off between the economic "good" that are betting edge and the further odd-numbered moments about the origin, and the economic "bad" that are (approximately) variance and the further even-numbered moments about the origin.
So is n-Kelly the end-all be-all of allocation utility? Clearly not. But at the very least it is a natural and logical extension of the parameter-less full-Kelly utility function. And while full-Kelly utility maximization does "happen" to imply expected growth maximization, there's nothing that should lead us to construe it as somehow "more optimal" across all possible sets of risk preferences. I love butterscotch ... do you?